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COMMENT ON STEPHEN MARKS'S UTILITY AND
COMMUNITY: MUSINGS ON THE TORT/CRIME
DISTINCTION
ALVIN K. KLEVORICK*
Stephen Marks provides an interesting exploration of the relation be-
tween tort and crime.' He tackles a number of difficult issues and raises a
variety of interesting questions. Professor Marks works within the social
utilitarian tradition as he attempts to use a social utility formulation both
to identify the acts a society designates as crimes and to determine the
optimal enforcement of the criminal law, specifically, the probability and
severity of the punishment society attaches to each crime. Marks's foun-
dational observation is that the categorization decision requires a social
utility function that includes the utility of criminal acts while the enforce-
ment decision should exclude the utility generated by the criminal act.
2
The latter point has a substantial history. It was the basis for George J.
Stigler's3 fundamental criticism of the social welfare function used by Ga-
ry S. Becker in his seminal article on the economics of crime and punish-
ment.4 As Marks argues, "if both criminalization and enforcement deci-
sions have social utilitarian explanations then these explanations must use
different social utility functions."
'5
Of course, an alternative to the line of analysis Professor Marks pur-
sues would be to allow for the possibility that while society seeks to opti-
mize a social utility function when setting enforcement policy, it makes
decisions about what categories of acts6 to criminalize on other
grounds-for example, on the basis of non-utilitarian moral considera-
* John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1 Stephen Marks, Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction,
76 B.U. L. REv. 215 (1996) [hereinafter Utility and Community].
2 Id. at 223 (suggesting same as a "two step process" by which we can use a social
utility function to account for both criminal classification and enforcement strategies).
s George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527
(1970) ("[W]hat evidence is there that society sets a positive value upon the utility
derived from murder, rape, or arson? In fact, the society has branded the utility de-
rived from such activities as illicit.").
4 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 172-73 (1968) (incorporating the "social value of the gain to offenders" as
part of an optimal criminal enforcement model).
6 Utility and Community, supra note 1, at 215.
6 Marks uses the words act, action, and activity interchangeably. Id. at 215 n.1. I
shall follow his lead in this regard, even though I believe it would be helpful to use the
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tions. Rather than pursue this alternative in detail, I will use these com-
ments to suggest that even on its own terms, Professor Marks's analysis
has not quite pointed the way out of what he calls "the criminal utility
conundrum."7
Marks's analytical strategy is to begin by examining the problem faced
by a society that is privileged to enjoy ideal circumstances. Its members
share the same social values and the same informational base; further,
they all will fully comply with whatever rules are established. He believes
that thinking about this wonderful world provides some insights into the
relation between crime and tort, but that even more follow when we relax
the assumptions of shared values, common information, and full compli-
ance. In particular, while Marks retains the shared values assumption
throughout, he relaxes, in turn, the premises of full compliance" and com-
mon information.9 First, he relaxes only the assumption of full compli-
ance, and then he allows as well for disparities in the information that the
society's members and courts possess.
Professor Marks's principal theme is that a two-step procedure should
be used to explain both criminalization and enforcement decisions. Soci-
ety derives the former from the full-compliance utility function, which
includes the utility of all activities (including those eventually character-
ized as crimes), while society determines levels of enforcement by opti-
mizing a social utility function from which it "strip[s] ... the utility from
prohibited activities and drop[s] the assumption of full compliance."'"
This approach provides a very suggestive metaphor. In deciding on an
enforcement strategy, we exclude the utility of criminal activity from the
account of society's welfare just as enforcement itself generally excludes
or detaches the criminal from the society or the community." As attrac-
tive as the metaphor is, I have some serious concerns about the analysis
Professor Marks uses to derive and support it.
First, in analyzing the world of shared values, shared information, and
full compliance, Professor Marks posits that "members choose laws to
maximize their shared social utility function."' Further he assumes that
this society "divides activities into three categories: prohibited activities,
activities that are permissible only if accompanied by compensation, and
distinction between act (or action) and activity in discussing differences between suits
brought in negligence and those brought in strict liability.
7 Id. at 223.
8 Id. Part IV.
9 Id. Part V.
10 Id. at 216.
11 Id ("By stripping criminal utility from the social utility function, society con-
firms that extracommunity acts will not receive credit. lypical punishments for crimes
•. symbolize this separation from the community.").
12 Id at 224.
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unconditionally permissible activities.' It is the set of prohibited activi-
ties that Marks identifies with crimes. He distinguishes between his as-
sumption that shared values lead each member of society to "share the
same vision of the social utility function" and an assumption-which he
eschews-that all people in society have the same individual utility func-
tion.
14
If, as Marks assumes, "[e]veryone shares the same values about what
constitutes a good society,"' 5 it is at least plausible that they all hold the
same view about which activities should receive no credit and thus should
be prohibited.'" But then the members of the society will exclude the
utility of these activities from the social utility function at the outset. As
a consequence, because Marks identifies crime with prohibited activities,
the social utility function he uses in this analysis is de facto of the crimi-
nal-exclusive type, rather than the criminal-inclusive type he asserts he is
using. As a result, it is not clear that. Marks's analysis of the world of
shared values, shared information, and full compliance can serve as the
first step he requires for his analysis.
Some of Professor Marks's analysis of his ideal world, in which all
members of society fully share values, information, and a willingness and
ability to comply with the rules, follows conventional lines. He observes,
for example, that in such a world we may require compensation so as to
provide a social test of an individual's decision about the value of an ac-
tivity when individual utility is unobservable." On the other hand, high
transaction costs, including those involved in ascertaining causal rela-
tions, forestall a strategy of requiring compensation for all activities.
Marks also appeals to the literature deriving from the seminal article by
Calabresi and Melamed' 8-including recent work by Ayres and Talley, 9
13 Id.
14 Id. at 223 n.28.
15 Id at 223.
16 Marks emphasizes that he takes "a full bodied approach to the social utility
function.... [M]embers' utility functions may incorporate not only goods and serv-
ices, but also values such as freedom, autonomy, and respect... [and] the utilities of
other members of society." Id. at 224. Presumably, the individual utility functions
can also assign substantial, perhaps overwhelming, negative weight to the activities
that everyone in the society agrees are disfavored.
17 Id at 225 (suggesting that society "prices" conditionally permissible activities to
allow individuals to engage in conduct resulting in "sufficiently high utility to the ac-
tor").
18 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV 1089 (1972).
19 Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Distinguishing Between Consensual and Non-Consensual Advantages of Liability
Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995).
1996]
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and by Kaplow and Shavel 20-to determine when transactions are best
governed by property rules and when best by liability rules.2 ' Curiously,
though, at one point he describes governing a transaction by a property
rule as rendering it "subject to prohibitions. '2 2 This is odd because both
previously and subsequently Marks identifies crimes as prohibited acts or
activities. In fact, to describe one of Marks's prohibited actions in the
language introduced by Calabresi and Melamed entails some convolu-
tion. One would have to say that the entitlement to be free of the prohib-
ited act is given to everyone in society and that entitlement is protected
by an inalienability rule.
Further, Marks goes on to say, rather cryptically, that "[i]n this simple
world, strict liability law and criminal law both support a transaction
structure defined by such laws as property law, contract law, corporation
law, the law of estates and trusts, tax law, commercial law, and securities
law." He does not tell us how strict liability law, here consisting of "a
list of conditionally permissible acts and a mechanism for the payment of
compensation,"' and criminal law, which here consists of "a list of
prohibitions,"25 provide this support. At most, they seem to tell us that in
each of these areas of law, there are permissible and impermissible acts.
It is, at least to me, not clear what Marks means when he uses the word
"support" in this context.
Finally, Marks demonstrates that in his hypothetical world of shared
values, common information, and full compliance, neither uncertainty
about an act's consequences nor the continuity or discontinuity of socie-
ty's classification of the care the actor exercises determines whether or
not the act is a crime.26 Hence, he demonstrates that several explanations
of the criminal category offered by other scholars27 do not apply in this
perfect environment. If these factors-uncertainty and continuity or dis-
continuity of the classification-are influential in delineating the criminal
category, it is because the assumptions of this socially frictionless world
do not hold.
Marks then goes on to use a different set of assumptions to analyze the
classification of criminal acts and the choice of enforcement strategies to
prevent them. In the model in Part IV, people continue to share the
20 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Property Rules Versus Liability Rules 109
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with the Boston University
Law Review); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate
Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995).
21 Utility and Community, supra note 1, Part III.D and accompanying notes.




26 Id. at 227-28.
27 See id. Part I (discussing various models used to distinguish crimes from torts).
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same views about what constitutes a good society and the same objective
view of reality, but social decision makers can no longer count on full
compliance with the rules that are set.' This society must decide not
only how to categorize acts-as prohibited, conditionally permitted and
hence requiring compensation, or unconditionally permitted-but also
how to respond when one of its members chooses to violate the law. For
this society, Marks proposes his two-step process: "Initially [the decision
makers] might consider the sort of laws-prohibiting, compensating, and
permitting-they would pass if they could rely on full compliance. Next,
they might consider modifying these laws and policies to account for non-
compliance."29 He advocates that in the first step society should use "a
social utility function that includes utility generated by all activities,"
while in the second step, in which society accounts for noncompliance,
the decision maker should use "a social utility function stripped of the
utility generated by prohibited activities. ' 0
Marks aptly notes that this two-step process has both utilitarian and
communitarian components.3 ' Society uses the full social utility function
to generate rules that govern community behavior, and by determining
which acts are prohibited, it decides which behavior to set apart from the
community. The utility derived from prohibited acts gets no weight
when, in the second stage, society sets its enforcement policy. Marks goes
on to say that his "description provides a preliminary account of the mor-
al condemnation associated with criminal law.... A prohibited act de-
taches the actor from the community even if momentarily., 3 2 Although
his approach certainly strikingly symbolizes the criminal's separation
from the community, it is not clear in what sense the description accounts
for moral condemnation.
My principal problem with Marks's development in this section is that
he does not provide an argument that his two-step process has desirable
properties or that it is optimal in a well-defined sense. He writes that
"[w]e can imagine our decision makers engaging in [this] two step pro-
cess"33 and that "this two step process and its two distinct social utility
functions makes sense." 4 But he does not provide a more formal argu-
ment that the two-step process has desirable properties. For example,
can it be demonstrated that the two-step process will provide the solution
to optimizing the original social utility function subject to all the relevant
constraints? Or does such a proof of optimality require further assump-
tions about the underlying structure of the problem? I suspect that it
28 Id. Part IV.
29 Id at 229.
30 Id.
31 Id. Part IV.B.
32 Id. at 232.
33 Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
,4 Id. (emphasis added).
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does and that what must be imposed is a set of separability conditions on
the original, full-scale social utility function. As the article stands,
Marks's argument is basically intuitionist in character and leaves its
claims to persuasiveness purely in the eye of the reader.
Marks goes on to suggest that "[i]f we wanted to distinguish prohibited
activities from conditionally permissible activities we could do so by im-
posing additional costs in the form of penalties." 5 Such penalties do
more than distinguish the two types of behavior; they provide an added
disincentive to those considering to undertake prohibited activities. Af-
ter describing how such a system would appear, Marks concludes that
"[t]he tort system may overlap the criminal system.""6 But the overlap
exists only because he adds a penalty to the requirement of compensation
for prohibited acts. Society could also impose a heavier penalty, howev-
er, and discard the requirement of compensation for such acts. In that
case, in Marks's world of shared values, shared information, but incom-
plete compliance, the tort system would not overlap the criminal law.
Professor Marks's final step is to relax both the assumption that all
members of society share the same information and the assumption that
everyone agrees to comply with the promulgated rules.37 He proposes
35 Id. at 231.
36 Id. at 232.
37 Id. Part V. Marks promises a future paper in which he will remove the shared
values assumption.
One could also analyze a model in which everyone shares the same vision of the
good society and agrees to comply with the promulgated rules, but not all agents have
the same objective view of reality. Such an analysis would permit a focus on the pure
effects of disparate information, in particular, that members of the community may
err and commit prohibited acts and that courts may err and incorrectly impose penal-
ties or require compensation.
There are many ways in which the informational structure could depart from the
base-case assumption of common information, and the analysis would have to be pre-
cise about the assumed structure of information in the society-who has what infor-
mation at what point in time. The implications of disparate information for the social
decision problem Marks considers in his Paper would depend on the particular infor-
mational structure.
Not all instances of disparate information would be of interest in such a shared
values, full compliance setting. Consider, for example, the situation that Marks ana-
lyzes in Part V but with the full compliance assumption restored. Problems arise for
society here because although the court can determine the socially optimal levels of
care to be taken by injurers and victims, it cannot observe the care they actually take.
As Marks notes, "[i]f the courts could observe care, they could use a negligence rule
to obtain socially optimal results." Id. at 235. But if individuals have full information
about their care levels, then in a shared values, full compliance world, the court could
simply announce the care levels that the parties should adopt. The individuals in soci-
ety would comply, and the social optimum would be achieved. In the example Marks
analyzes in this Part, the court knows that social costs are minimized when both the
injurer and the potential victim adopt medium care; announcing that requirement,
HeinOnline -- 76 B. U. L. Rev. 246 1996
COMMENTS ON MARKS
two alternative approaches to coping with the incentive problems created
when these premises are no longer valid. One of the strategies he identi-
fies with tort and the other with crime. The tort strategy "imposes com-
pensation on the basis of correlated proxies," which are observable vari-
ables that correlate with the desired or undesired behavior.3 8 The crime
strategy "imposes penalties but limits liability through protections such as
higher standards of proof, greater specificity, the requirement of intent,
strict rules of evidence, procedural due process, and by limiting applica-
tion to continuous (categorical) prohibitions or to the extreme range of
discontinuous prohibitions." 9 He argues that the different characteristics
of these strategies-especially the greater expense of the criminal ap-
proach-should determine whether we treat a particular prohibition as a
crime or as a tort.
Professor Marks's analysis in this part of the Paper is fairly straightfor-
ward, and his delineation of alternative strategies is clear. His considera-
tion of correlated proxies follows the lines of conventional law-and-eco-
nomics analysis of liability rules in two-party accidents.4" The novelty is
that the court cannot observe the variable it wants to control, namely, the
level of care chosen by each party. It would have been helpful to have a
more precise statement of the equilibrium concept Marks is using to ana-
lyze the important case of bilateral strict liability for inadvertent acts.4'
In addition, Marks should have proven, rather than just illustrated by
example, a central conclusion concerning his analysis of the tort strategy
in this case. He observes that using correlated proxies to impose liability
"can result in liability even when an actor employs the optimal level of
care." 42 But he then states that "as long as liability results exclusively in
compensation, this possibility will not deter desirable activity."'43 This
point is crucial because it provides the foundation of Marks's argument
that the alternative, criminal strategy requires more protections than the
tort approach does. He writes:
In a sense, the strategy of correlated proxies tolerates occasional
mistakes (liability when the actor did indeed do the right thing) but
and doing nothing more, would achieve social optimality. Such a simple solution
would not be available if the members of the community themselves lacked informa-
tion, or had disparate information about their environment, or if the court could not
ascertain the social optimum. Analysis of enforcement strategies in these more com-
plex settings would be of interest.
38 Id. at 239.
39 Id.
40 For examples of this analysis, see generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988); STEVEN SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AccI-
DENT LAW (1987).
41 Utility and Community, supra note 1, at 236-38.
42 Id. at 238.
43 Id.
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limits the incentive effects of these mistakes by limiting the conse-
quence of liability to compensation only. However, there may be
reasons why we wish to deter prohibited acts by penalizing certain
behavior beyond the mere payment of compensation. If so, we must
first address the possibility that mistakes will deter desired behav-
ior.44
It is for this reason, he argues, that the criminal strategy of penalties re-
quires the adoption of additional precautions to reduce the probability
that courts will err in imposing liability.
There is, however, one more gap in the argument in the section on
disparate information. In the above-quoted introduction of the criminal
approach of penalties, Marks indicates that there may be reasons why
society might want to impose penalties and not simply require compensa-
tion for inadvertent acts. Because he does not describe what those rea-
sons are, he does not demonstrate that they can be introduced in a logi-
cally consistent manner into the theoretical structure he has developed up
to this point. Furthermore, if these reasons can be incorporated into his
model, does bringing them into the analysis leave Marks's previous con-
clusions intact?
In concluding his Paper, Professor Marks remarks that he has "tried to
resolve the apparent conflict between criminal utility inclusion and exclu-
sion"-to explain "the criminal utility conundrum"-through his theoret-
ical two-step procedure.45 I believe that his procedure provides a way of
coping with this conundrum, not an explanation of it. More importantly,
though, Marks's discussion of his procedure illuminates a number of im-
portant features of the tort/crime distinction. His exploration of what he
refers to as "the border area between tort and crime"' has added to our
knowledge of the terrain at that border.
44 Id. at 239.
45 Id. at 240.
4 Id. at 217.
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